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STUDENT NOTES
CmcINAL LAw-HoNaciDE-DEFENDANT'S
CAUSED

By NON-ATTENTION

TO WOUND

GUILT WHERE DEATn Is

INFLICTED BY DEFENDANT.-One

Young and defendant met in a store, and Young said to defendant,
"You accuse me of stealing your liquor," and hit him with his left hand.
Defendant then cut Young with a knife, inflicting a wound about
three inches long upon the biceps muscle of his left arm. The wound
became Infected and Young suffered from lockjaw. Later galloping
consumption developed, and Young died some thirty or forty days
subsequent to the injury. Defendant was indicted for the murder of
Young, found guilty of manslaughter, and punishment by imprisonment
for two years was fixed by the verdict of a jury. The Circuit Court
granted a new trial, and the Commonwealth prosecuted an appeal to
have the law certified. The Court of Appeals said, "Where a dangerous
wound is wrongfully inflicted, although of a character not necessarily
calculated to cause death, yet by reason of infection does result fatally,
it is sufficient to sustain a prosecution for homicide." Commonwealth
v. Kilburn, 34 S. W. (2nd) 728 (1931).
This is the general rule both in Kentucky and elsewhere. As early
as the seventeenth century it was said, "If one gives wounds to another,
who neglects the cure of them, or is disorderly and doth not keep that
rule which a person wounded should do; yet, if he die, it is murder
or manslaughter, according as the case is, in the person who gave the
wounds, because, if the wounds had not been, the man had not died;
and therefore neglect or disorder in the person who received the
wounds shall not excuse the person who gave them." Rew's Case, J.
Kelyng 26 (1664).
This view is further upheld in the leading American case upon the
subject, speaking of the reason for the rule, "The principle on which
this rule Is founded is one of universal application, and lies at the
foundation of all our criminal jurisprudence. It is, that every person
is to be held to contemplate and to be responsible f9r the natural
consequences of his own acts. If a person inflicts a wound with a
deadly weapon in such manner as to put life in jeapordy, and death
follows as a consequence of this felonious and wicked act, it does not
alter Its nature or diminish its criminalty to prove that other causes
co-operated in producing the fatal result. Indeed, it may be said that
neglect of the wound or its unskillful and improper treatment, which
were of themselves consequences of the criminal act, which might
naturally follow in any case, must in law be deemed to have been
among those which were in contemplation of the guilty party, and
for which he Is to be held responsible." Commonwealth v. Hackett,
2 Allen, 137 (1861).
The Kentucky rule Is stated In Payne v. CJommonwealth, 20 Ky.
L. Rep. 475, 45 S. W. 704 (1898), where It was held that the fact
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that the deceased did not go to the hospital where she died for some
two days after she was injured, and did not receive medical attention
in the meantime did not affect the defendant's responsibility In the
least.
One of the best discussions of the problem is found in the case of
Hopkins v. U. S., 4 App. Cas. (Dist. of Col.) 430 (1894), in which it
was said, "If it were conceded that the deceased was not prudent and
did not take proper care of himself, with a view to his possible
recovery, or that he neglected to obtain proper medical treatment, such
concession would not relieve the appellant of criminal responsibility
for the blow inflicted."
The scope of this note does not extend beyond the cases where death
was due to the non-attention of the deceased. No effort will be made
to discuss those cases where there is erroneous medical treatment or
an intervening force which was the sole cause of death.
A man is not responsible for the death of another unless it was
the proximate consequence of his act or omission. The first essential
of causation is that the culpable act or omission should be a causa
sine qua non, i. e., if the culpable act or omission had not taken place
the death would not have followed. But where this causal connection
is established the defendant is guilty of homicide because every person
is held to contemplate and be responsible for the natural consequences
of his own acts. Such a rule is based upon sound policy. A different
doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from
human life one of its most essential safeguards. What with the conflicting theories of medical men, and the uncertainties concurrent with
the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in
many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of
death, and thereby to open a wide door by which persons guilty of the
greatest of crimes might escape conviction and punishment.
Hardship will result here, perhaps, as it will always result, from
any rule of law. But it is difficult to imagine one knowingly failing
to give himself proper attention when injured. One of the strongest
instincts of mankind is that of self-preservation. The only case where
there may be injustice is where the deceased was not ordinarily
prudent because of his ignorance as to such matters. For instance.
if A in an instant of anger slightly scratch B who, though the wound
becomes infected, does not give it attention, thinking it Is of no
importance, and later B dies from blood-poisoning, A Is guilty of
homicide. It would seem that it is unjust that for so small an act A
should be guilty of so great a crime. Yet the reasons supporting the
rule of law outweigh so greatly those against it that to cite chance
instances of injustice is to permit consideration for the individual to
overcome consideration for the good of the people as a whole.
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